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Abstract
The market for vaccinations is widely believed to be characterized by market fail-
ures, because individuals do not internalize the positive externalities that their vac-
cination decisions may confer on other individuals. Francis (1997) provided a set of
assumptions under which the equilibrium vaccination pattern is socially optimal. We
show that his conditions are not necessary for the welfare theorem to hold but that
in general, the market yields ine¢ ciently low vaccination uptake. Equilibrium non-
optimality may obtain if (i) agents can recover from infection, (ii) vaccines are imper-
fect, (iii) individuals are ex ante heterogeneous, (v) vaccination timing is inexible or
(v) the planning horizon is nite. Apart from the case with heterogeneity, ine¢ ciencies
result from the presence of strategic interaction.
JEL Classication: C73, I18.
Keywords: Economic epidemiology, optimal vaccination, equilibrium vaccination, ex-
ternalities.
Highlights: Several economic models of vaccination are analyzed. Equilibrium vacci-
nation is compared to socially optimal vaccination. Features of diseases, vaccines and
markets that lead to ine¢ ciencies are identied.
1 Introduction
For many important infectious diseases, the main tool used in the quest for management
or eradication lies in vaccination against infection. Yet, while there is no doubting the
private and public benets from widespread vaccine uptake, there are important fundamental
questions about vaccination markets (and vaccination demand) that remain unanswered.
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Vaccinations are generally believed to be prima facie examples of actions with strong
positive externalities. The idea driving this belief is beguilingly simple. If someone is vac-
cinated against an infectious disease, then this individual ceases to be a source or conduit
of infection to other individuals.1 Once positive external e¤ects from vaccination are recog-
nized, it follows naturally that if these are not properly internalized by individuals, then
there is a strong case for public intervention, since a self-interested individual would tend to
under-vaccinate relative to the socially optimal level.2 This line of thinking, although intu-
itively appealing, turns out to depend delicately on the details of the environment, i.e. on
the characteristics of the population, the disease and the available vaccine. In a controversial
paper, Francis (1997) shows, using an innite horizon susceptible-infected-removed model of
epidemics without spontaneous recovery, that the market for vaccinations is e¢ cient (i.e. it
induces the socially optimal outcome) if individuals are ex ante homogeneous, the vaccine
is perfect and vaccination can be taken at any point in time. The Francis welfare theorem
goes against the grain of the general understanding of the properties of vaccination markets.
In fact, Francis (1997) himself seems reluctant to claim any generality of the result, and
indeed provides a long list of modications to the model that could potentially alter his
counter-intuitive nding.3 ;4 Despite a growing literature on the economics of vaccination, we
believe that there are many facets of vaccination markets that are not yet fully understood.
Furthermore, a better understanding of the role of externalities in decentralized vaccination
decisions may also inform policy recommendations. Specically, we will seek to answer the
following two questions: (i) are decentralized vaccination markets e¢ cient in the sense that
they maximize social welfare? and (ii) if not, what is the source of the ine¢ ciencies?
In addressing these questions, we will conduct a formal analysis by drawing heavily on
methods and insights from economics. We do so for two distinct reasons. First, in answering
what an optimalpolicy is, one must explicitly identify and address the basic tradeo¤s that
must be resolved. In practice, this means that one must not focus only on the direct costs of
infection, but also at broader social costs to the economic environment and the costs involved
in controlling the disease. The tools of economics are explicitly developed to analyze this
kind of tradeo¤s.5 Second, when dealing with decentralized markets in which individuals
make (possibly) non-coordinated decisions on whether to get vaccinated, one must explicitly
model individual decision making. In doing so, it must be recognized that individuals do
not merely respond passively in a privately optimal way to what other individuals do, but
may also be strategically sophisticated and take into account their conjectures about other
individualsfuture actions. In considering such situations, economics and game theory again
provide the adequate tools of analysis. There is ample evidence that individual behavior is
critical for understanding aggregate disease evolution, as emphasized by Auld (2003), Reluga
1In epidemiology, the well-known concept of herd immunity, i.e. that a disease can be eradicated without
vaccinating the entire population, is itself a reection of the idea of externalities in vaccination.
2For an interesting instance of private individuals over-vaccinating in equilibrium relative to the social
optimum, see Liu et al. (2012).
3Curiously, he does not pinpoint the central properties driving his result.
4A result related to that of Francis (1997) holds in an SI model with non-vaccine prevention, as shown
in Toxvaerd (2009).
5For nice illustrations of the kind of tradeo¤s that disease control involves, see e.g. Smith et al. (2009)
and Keogh-Brown et al. (2009).
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(2010), Fenichel et al. (2011) and Fenichel (2013).
In this paper, we analyze under what conditions the Francis welfare theorem holds. We ar-
gue that there are two central features of the Francis (1997) framework that lead equilibrium
vaccination decisions to coincide with the social optimum. These are that (a) individuals are
ex ante homogenous and (b) that there is no strategic interaction in vaccination decisions.
Our results suggest that (a) and (b) are not necessary or su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium
vaccination patterns to be socially ine¢ cient.
Before explaining the reasons for these results, we start by explaining why the welfare
theorem is true under the su¢ cient conditions of Francis (1997). When there is an innite
horizon, the vaccine is perfect, there is no possible recovery and the vaccination timing is
perfectly exible, then there are no strategic interactions. This is because an individuals
optimal vaccination policy (under decentralized decision making) is myopic in the sense
that if the current prevalence is at or above a critical value, then it is optimal to vaccinate;
otherwise, it is optimal not to vaccinate. A consequence of this is that, no matter what other
individuals are currently doing or will do in the future, the individuals optimal policy is the
same. That is, the individuals decision is independent of the actions of other individuals.
Moreover, when individuals are ex ante identical, they have the same optimal policy. But this
implies that a decentralized equilibrium has to be symmetric. Last, because of symmetry,
all individuals are perfectly protected against infection at the same time (because they
all vaccinate at the same time) and hence there are no external e¤ects in equilibrium.6
As a consequence, the equilibrium under decentralized decision making is socially e¢ cient.
Clearly, this result rests in an important way on the ex ante homogeneity of the population, as
recognized by Gersovitz (2003) and Kessing and Nuscheler (2003). Ex ante heterogeneity also
is central to the study by Veliov (2005), while Fenichel (2013) emphasizes that endogenous
(ex post) heterogeneity may have important e¤ects on the social optimality of equilibrium
levels of social distancing (i.e. infection reducing strategies).
Given the insight we have just outlined, it is easy to see why relaxing ex ante homogeneity
may invalidate the welfare theorem. With heterogeneous agents, it is again the case that an
individuals optimal policy under decentralized decision making is myopic; therefore, there
are no strategic interactions. However, because of heterogeneity, the di¤erent individuals
critical prevalence values di¤er, which means that an equilibrium is not symmetric. But
asymmetry implies that there are external e¤ects in equilibrium, because non-vaccinated
individuals are inuenced by the decisions of vaccinating individuals. Hence, the equilibrium
is in this case need not be socially e¢ cient.
It is a priori less clear what role is played by the assumptions of an innite planning
horizon, by the impossibility of recovery or by the perfect exibility in vaccination timing.
In each of these cases, it turns out that an individuals optimal policy under decentralized
decision making is not myopic. Thus in any time period, the individuals decision depends
on the prevalence in that time period as well as on the expected prevalence in future time
periods. But since the prevalence in future time periods depends on the actions of other
individuals, strategic interactions are present. As a result, there are external e¤ects; thus
6The fact that immune individuals are una¤ected by othersvaccination decisions (and indeed by any
changes in disease prevalence) was rst noted by Brito et al. (1991), where they used this insight to show
that mandatory vaccination of the entire population would not be socially optimal.
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equilibrium vaccination decisions are not generally socially e¢ cient.
We note that when there are strategic interactions, the equilibrium may or may not be ex
post symmetric. This means that heterogeneity is a su¢ cient but not a necessary condition
for decentralized equilibrium vaccine uptake to be socially ine¢ cient. This nding also serves
to emphasize that while ex ante heterogeneity is indeed an important source of ine¢ cient
vaccine uptake, the presence of strategic interactions (which we show can stem from multiple
sources) represents a distinct source for possible ine¢ ciencies, even when the population is
homogeneous. This nding is important, because it shows that wrong policy conclusions
may result from a single-minded focus on homogeneity/symmetry.
As we will argue in detail below, the Francis welfare theorem holds under a special (but
by no means contrived) set of assumptions. Nonetheless, its importance lies in the fact that
these modeling assumptions are the natural starting point of any analysis of vaccination
externalities. The welfare theorem therefore serves as a benchmark for the economics of
vaccination, against which one can compare less stylized and more realistic models. In
particular, our analysis makes clear that it is unhelpful simply to assert that decentralized
vaccination decisions involve externalities, since the nature and causes of externalities
(and therefore their possible remedies) depend in delicate ways on the chosen modeling
assumptions.
1.1 Related Literature
The economic control of vaccination markets was rst studied formally by Hethcote and
Waltman (1973) and Morton and Wickwire (1974). In these papers, and in many subsequent
contributions building on this work (such as Veliov, 2008 and Hansen and Day, 2011), a cen-
tral planner controls the vaccination decisions of each and every individual in the population
in order to maximize some criterion of social welfare. In doing so, they not only uncovered
the basic tradeo¤s involved in disease control, but they also established the benchmark of
optimality that any policy intervention should be measured against. These early papers did
not consider individual decision making and hence did not explicitly consider the possibility
of uninternalized externalities between individualsdecisions on whether to vaccinate. Fine
and Clarkson (1986) seem to have made the rst formal analysis of vaccination decisions
featuring such considerations. Stiglitz (1988) contains a verbal discussion of the problem of
externalities, and proposes government intervention in order to counter a perceived market
failure.7
General considerations on the economics of vaccination demand and production can be
found in Kremer (2000a, 2000b) and recent reviews of the economic epidemiology literature
can be found in Gersovitz (2011) and in Klein et al. (2007). The rst formal treatment
within a mainstream economic setting is that of Brito et al. (1991). They nd in a static
setting with heterogeneous individuals that under decentralized decision making, individuals
under-vaccinate because they do not internalize the positive benets to other individuals.8
7Stiglitzdiscussion has initiated response and counterresponses by Philipson (2000), Gersovitz (2003),
Gersovitz and Hammer (2003) and Gersovitz (2011), respectively.
8The analysis of Kureishi (2009) builds on that of Brito et al. (1991) and therefore arrive at similar
conclusions. Other related (static) analyses include Xu (1999), Heal and Kunreuther (2005) and Althouse
et al. (2010).
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The same is true in the model considered by Geo¤ard and Philipson (1997) which, although
dynamic, disregards the dynamics of the vaccination decisions themselves (vaccination is
assumed to take place at birth).9 Boulier et al. (2007) consider a dynamic vaccination
model with non-dynamic vaccination decisions and recover the ine¢ ciency result of Brito
et al. (1991). Similarly, Barrett (2003) nds market failures in a dynamic model with
homogeneous individuals but with non-dynamic vaccination choices. Last, Francis (2004)
also nds a similar result, but assumes that individuals do not discount the future, which
renders the time prole of infections irrelevant. Gersovitz (2003) considers a vaccination
model in which individuals care about their own welfare, but where the planner also cares
about the welfare of future generations. He shows that if not for this di¤erence in objectives,
the planner and the representative household would agree on the optimal policy. Last, Francis
(2007) studies a fully dynamic setting with a heterogeneous population and allegedly recovers
the welfare theorem in this setting.
There are a number of papers that study vaccination in di¤erent settings under either
centralized or decentralized decision making (but which do not compare the two). In the
former category are contributions by Hethcote and Waltman (1973), Morton and Wickwire
(1974), Wickwire (1975) and Behncke (2000). In the latter category are contributions by
Bauch and Earn (2004), Bauch (2005), Chen (2006), Cojocaru et al. (2007), Chen and
Cottrell (2009) and Goyal and Vigier (2010). Sadique et al. (2005) take a somewhat di¤erent
approach and consider decision theoretical aspects of vaccination.
Last, there is a related but distinct literature on non-vaccine protective measures (such
as condoms and bed nets). See e.g., Toxvaerd (2009) for a review of that literature.10
In recent years, a new breed of papers has emerged, dealing with di¤erent aspects of
behavioral epidemiology, i.e. models in which agents either behave in a boundedly rational
manner, or in which information about diseases or the value of vaccination spreads gradually
via word-of-mouth learning (see e.g. Medlock et al., 2009, dOnofrio et al., 2012, Manfredi
and dOnofrio, 2013 and Fenichel and Wang, 3013). These types of approaches seem like the
natural next step once the more stylized models of economic epidemiology have been well
understood.
For completeness, we should mention three types of vaccination policies that are staples
of the mathematical epidemiology literature. First, many papers consider so-called pulse
vaccination. Pulse vaccination is a discrete increase in the vaccination rate at discrete points
in time (e.g., the vaccination of some subpopulation at regular intervals). Second, many
papers consider vaccination of all susceptibles in the population at a constant rate. Last,
many papers consider the vaccination of some constant fraction of all newborns. Common
to these policies is that they are not derived as part of an explicit optimization programme
or as an equilibrium outcome. While they are very useful in understanding how vaccinations
9While the analysis of Geo¤ard and Philipson (1997) is mainly positive, it contains some discussion of
normative issues.
10We note that there exists a smaller literature on the supply side of the market for vaccinations, i.e.,
the industrial organization of vaccine production. Kremer (2000a, 2000b), Kessing and Nuscheler (2003),
Kremer and Snyder (2003), Forslid (2005) and Forslid and Herzing (2008) study di¤erent settings with a
monopolist producer. Mechoulan (2005), Kremer et al. (2008) and Boulier (2009) analyze di¤erent aspects
of the regulation of monopolists and also study aspects of imperfectly and perfectly competitive markets for
vaccines.
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change the mechanics of disease propagation, they are not useful for making policy recom-
mendations unless coupled with an explicit welfare criterion like that found in the economic
epidemiology literature.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set out the model. In Section 3, we
derive a discrete-time analog of the welfare theorem in Francis (1997). We then show that the
welfare results may cease to hold if individuals may recover spontaneously from the disease
(Section 4), if vaccines are imperfect (Section 5), if individuals are ex ante heterogeneous
(Section 6), if the timing of vaccination is inexible (Section 7) or if the planning horizon
is nite (Section 8). Section 9 concludes while the Appendix contains further details on the
analysis.
In each section, we note which existing papers share properties with our particular version
of the model. The present paper therefore also serves to tie together seemingly disparate
models and results in the literature.
2 The Basic Model
The vaccination model we consider is based on the classical susceptible-infected-recovered
(SIR) model. In this model, individuals go through the health states indicated in the name.
In the classical (uncontrolled) SIR model, susceptible individuals in a population mix with
other individuals and are thereby exposed to an infectious disease. Once infected, an indi-
vidual transitions from the susceptible to the infected state. Upon infection, an individual
may recover spontaneously from the infection, thereby making a transition to the recovered
(or removed) state. Once recovered, the individual is no longer susceptible. Vaccination
models are typically SIR models in which vaccination takes an individual directly from the
susceptible state to the recovered state (thereby bypassing the infected state) if the vaccine
is perfect and to a temporary protected state if it is imperfect.
For simplicity and convenience, we consider a population with three individuals (indi-
viduals 1, 2, and 3). There is an infectious disease circulating in the population, and each
individual can be in one of three health states in any given period: susceptible, infected,
or protected. An individual can become protected by either (i) getting vaccinated; or (ii)
acquiring natural immunity after recovering from an infection. The per period cost of being
infected (in utils) is  > 0. Assume that a vaccine exists and that a susceptible individual
i, i = 1; 2; 3, can get vaccinated in any period at a cost ci > 0. The vaccine confers lifelong
immunity (i.e. it does not wane). Individuals discount the future using the discount factor
 2 [0; 1).
The transmission process of the disease is given as follows. If a susceptible individual
chooses not to be vaccinated in some period, then that individual becomes infected in the
next period with a probability that is proportional to the fraction of other individuals that
are currently infected. This proportionality factor is the transmission probability  2 (0; 1].
If the individual chooses to be vaccinated, then the transmission probability decreases to
 (1  "), where " 2 [0; 1] is the e¢ cacy of the vaccine. For example, if in period t individual
3 is the only infected individual, then the probability that individual 1 will be infected in
period t + 1 is =2 if individual 1 chooses not to be vaccinated in period t, and it drops
to  (1  ") =2 if individual 1 is vaccinated in period t. For simplicity and without loss of
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generality, set  = 1. Assume that initially (i.e., at t = 0) individual 3 is infected and the
other two individuals (individuals 1 and 2) are susceptible.
If an individual is infected in period t, then the individual recovers with probability
 2 [0; 1] in period t + 1 for any t. We assume that a recovered individual is perfectly
immune to the disease and cannot be reinfected. To facilitate our discussion, we will assume
that if the vaccine is not perfectly e¤ective (i.e., if " < 1), then the probability of recovery 
is 0. This is done purely for ease of notation: if infected individuals can recover and become
fully immune when the vaccine e¢ cacy is less than 100%, then we would have to keep track
of two types of protected individuals (those protected imperfectly by vaccines, and those
protected perfectly through having been infected) instead of just one type.
In any period, the state of the population is given by the two-tuple (I; P ), where I is the
number of infected individuals and P is the number of individuals that are protected in the
current period. With three individuals, the state space is thus

 = f(3; 0) ; (2; 0) ; (1; 0) ; (0; 0) ; (2; 1) ; (1; 1) ; (0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (0; 2) ; (0; 3)g :
Individuals make decisions regarding whether to vaccinate or not only when they are sus-
ceptible, and at least one susceptible individual exists in the subset 
S  
, where

S = f(2; 0) ; (1; 0) ; (0; 0) ; (1; 1) ; (0; 1) ; (0; 2)g :
For convenience, dene 
iS  
S to be the set of population states in which individual i is
susceptible. Similarly, let 
iP  
 be the set of population states in which individual i is
protected.
We have chosen to conduct the analysis in this simple three-individual setting for two
reasons. First, it allows us to make a number of points using elementary mathematics,
thereby making the results easily accessible to those mainly interested in the policy relevant
conclusions. Second, the setting allows us to conduct the analysis analytically and to obtain
closed form solutions throughout.
Throughout, we assume that individuals non-cooperatively minimize their individual ex-
pected, discounted lifetime cost, while the social planner minimizes the sum of all individuals
expected, discounted lifetime cost. When analyzing decentralized decision-making, we re-
strict attention to Markov strategies where a susceptible individuals action in any period t
depends only on the state of the population in that period and on calendar time t (see e.g.
Maskin and Tirole, 2001 for more details). More formally, a pure strategy i for individual
i, i = 1; 2, species for any t whether to get vaccinated or not for every element in 
iS, i.e.,
i : 

i
S  N ! f0; 1g, where i = 1 denotes vaccinate and i = 0 denotes not vaccinate.11
In a Markov perfect equilibrium, every individuals strategy is optimal given the strategies
of the other individuals.
The social planner, on the other hand, chooses for every state in 
S which susceptible
individual or individuals to vaccinate in order to minimize social cost, i.e., the sum of all
individualsexpected, discounted lifetime cost. Note that a susceptible individual has prob-
ability 0 of becoming infected in states (0; 0), (0; 1), or (0; 2). Therefore, in any of these
11Since, by assumption, individual 3 will never be susceptible, there is no need to consider individual 3s
strategy.
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states, a susceptible individual would not vaccinate in equilibrium, and the social planner
would not choose to vaccinate any susceptible individual. Throughout, we assume that the
population under consideration is closed, i.e., there are no births or deaths. We do so in
order to focus exclusively on the e¤ects that decentralization of vaccination decisions have
on social welfare.12
We use dynamic programming to solve each susceptible individuals optimization problem
under decentralized decision-making, as well as the social planners optimization problem.13
For the decentralized case, let Ui;t (!;j), i = 1; 2, i 6= j, denote the value of individual
is cost minimization problem in period t i.e., the minimum expected, discounted lifetime
cost for individual i starting in period t if the state of the population in t is ! 2 
iS,
individual i is susceptible in t, and individual j uses the strategy j. Similarly, let Vi;t (!;j)
denote individual is expected, discounted lifetime cost starting in period t if individual i is
protected by vaccination in t, the state of the population in t is ! 2 
iP , and individual j
uses the strategy j. If individual i is infected in period t, let U i;t denote the individuals
expected, discounted lifetime cost starting in t. Note that, given our assumption of the
recovery process, U i;t satises the following condition:
U i;t =  +  (1  )U i;t+1. (1)
To see what individual i should do in period t when she is susceptible, the population is
in state (I; P ) 2 
iS, and individual j is using strategy j, consider individual is options.
 By vaccinating, individual i incurs the cost ci in the current period. In the following
period, individual i becomes protected with probability 1  (1  ") I
2
and infected with
probability (1  ") I
2
. If she is protected by vaccination in the following period when
the state of the population is !0, then her expected, discounted lifetime cost from
that point onwards is Vi;t+1 (!0;j). If she is infected in the following period, then her
expected, discounted lifetime cost from that point onwards is U i;t+1. Therefore, the
discounted, expected lifetime cost from vaccinating in the current period is
 Vi;t ((I; P ))  ci+
24(1  ") I
2
U i;t+1 +

1  (1  ") I
2
 X
!02
iP
QV (!
0 j (I; P ) ;j)Vi;t+1 (!0;j)
35 ,
(2)
where QV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j) is the probability that conditional on individual i not get-
ting infected the state of the population in the next period is !0 given that the current
12Gersovitz (2003) shows that if the population grows over time, then the planners solution will not coin-
cide with the decentralized equilibrium outcome. This is because the individuals only consider themselves,
while the planner also considers the welfare of future generations. The right interpretation of this result is
not that decentralization per se leads to suboptimal vaccination uptake. What drives the di¤erence between
the optimal outcome and the equilibrium outcome is that the two decision makers are looking at the welfare
of two di¤erent groups (the planner values current and future generations, while the household only cares
about the present generation). Thus the di¤erent outcomes are hard-wired into the preferences. This does
not mean that the distortion in vaccination decisions brought about by a growing population is not impor-
tant. It clearly is, but it is di¤erent in nature from the ones studied here. We conjecture, but have not
shown, that if individuals have dynastic preferences (i.e., they care about the welfare of their own o¤spring),
then the welfare theorem is restored even with a growing population.
13For a good exposition of dynamic programming techniques, see e.g. Stokey and Lucas (1989).
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state is (I; P ), individual i vaccinates in the current period, and individual j uses strat-
egy j.
 By not vaccinating, individual i incurs no cost in the current period. In the following
period, individual i remains susceptible with probability 1   I
2
and becomes infected
with probability I
2
. If she remains susceptible in the following period when the state
of the population is !0, then her expected, discounted lifetime cost from that point
onwards is Ui;t+1 (!0;j). If she is infected in the following period, then her expected,
discounted lifetime cost from that point inwards is U i;t+1. Therefore, the expected,
discounted lifetime cost from not vaccinating in the current period is
 NVi;t ((I; P ))  
24I
2
U i;t+1 +

1  I
2
 X
!02
iS
QNV (!
0 j (I; P ) ;j)Ui;t+1 (!0;j)
35 , (3)
where QNV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j) is the probability that conditional on individual i not get-
ting infected the state of the population in the next period is !0 given that the current
state is (I; P ), individual i does not vaccinate in the current period, and individual j
uses strategy j.
The above observations thus imply that the value function Ui;t must satisfy the Bellman
equation
Ui;t ((I; P ) ;j) = min

 Vi;t ((I; P )) ; 
NV
i;t ((I; P ))
	
. (4)
To derive the value function Vi;t, note that if individual i is protected by vaccination in
period t, the state of the population is (I; P ), and individual j uses the strategy j, then
with probability 1  (1  ") I
2
individual i will remain protected in the following period; from
that point onwards, individual is expected, discounted lifetime cost is Vi;t+1 (!0;j) if !0 is
the state of the population in the next period. With probability (1  ") I
2
, individual i will
become infected in the next period, and her expected, discounted lifetime cost from then on
is U i;t+1. Therefore, Vi;t solves
Vi;t ((I; P ) ;j) = 
24(1  ") I
2
U i;t+1 +

1  (1  ") I
2
 X
!02
iP
QV (!
0 j (I; P ) ;j)Vi;t+1 (!0;j)
35 :
(5)
An equilibrium in the decentralized case is dened formally below.
Denition 1 If, for i; j = 1; 2 and all (I; P ) 2 
iS,
i ((I; P ) ; t) =

1 if  Vi;t ((I; P ))   NVi;t ((I; P ))
0 if  Vi;t ((I; P ))   NVi;t ((I; P )) ,
then (1; 2) is an equilibrium of the decentralized market.
Now, let us consider how to solve the social planners problem. For ease of exposition,
in this section we will assume that all individuals have the same vaccination cost when
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we formally state the social planners optimization problem. In terms of problem set-up,
nothing is substantively altered when individualsvaccination costs di¤er, and we defer the
analysis of this case to section 6. To proceed, dene Wt (!) to be the value of the planners
problem i.e., the minimum sum of all individualsexpected, discounted lifetime cost if the
current state of the population is ! 2 
. Now, if ! 2 
S, then the planner has to choose
how many susceptible individuals to vaccinate in the current period. If the planner chooses
to vaccinate n susceptible individuals, then assuming all individuals have the same cost of
vaccination c a total cost of nc is incurred in the current period; and if the state of the
population changes to !0 in the following period, then the minimum sum of all expected,
discounted lifetime cost from then on is Wt+1 (!0). Therefore, if (I; P ) 2 
S, Wt ((I; P ))
must solve the Bellman equation
Wt ((I; P )) = I + min
n
(
nc+ 
X
!02

Q (!0 j (I; P ) ; n)Wt+1 (!0)
)
, (6)
where Q (!0 j (I; P ) ; n) denotes the probability that the state of the population in the next
period is !0 given that the current state is (I; P ) and n susceptible individuals are vaccinated
in the current period. For (I; P ) =2 
S, Wt ((I; P )) satises
Wt ((I; P )) = I + 
X
!02

Q (!0 j (I; P ) ; 0)Wt+1 (!0) . (7)
For later use, note that a policy that maximizes social welfare (i.e. solves the planers
maximization problem) is said to be e¢ cientor rst-best optimal.
A list of the notations used here, as well as their descriptions, are given in the table
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below.
Notation Description
 cost of being infected
ci cost of vaccination for individual i
 discount factor
 transmission probability
" vaccine e¢ cacy
 probability of recovery from infection
I number of infected individuals
P number of protected individuals

 set of all population states (I; P )

S set of population states with at least one susceptible individual

iS set of population states in which individual i is susceptible

iP set of population states in which individual i is protected
i vaccination strategy of individual i
Ui;t individual is value function in period t given that individual i is susceptible
Vi;t individual is value function in period t given that individual i is protected
U i;t individual is value function in period t given that individual i is infected
Q transition probability function for the social planners problem
QV
transition probability function for an individuals decision problem if the
individual is vaccinated
QNV
transition probability function for an individuals decision problem if the
individual does not vaccinate
Wt the social planners value function in period t
3 The Welfare Theorem
In this section, we present the Francis welfare theorem. The central assumptions are as
follows.
A1 Individuals cannot recover from infection.
A2 Vaccination confers perfect immunity.
A3 Individuals are ex ante homogeneous.
A4 Individuals can vaccinate in any time period.
A5 Individuals are innitely-lived.
With these assumptions in place, we can now state the following result.
Welfare Theorem The equilibrium pattern of vaccination is socially optimal if assumptions
A1-A5 are satised.
In this section, we prove the Francis welfare theorem in our setting. In subsequent
sections, we relax each of Assumptions A1-A5 in turn and study the implications for the
social optimality of equilibrium vaccination patterns.
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3.1 Equilibrium Vaccination
Following the stated assumptions, set  = 0, " = 1, and c1 = c2 = c.14 Note that, in this
case, an individual is protected if and only if the individual has been vaccinated. Let us
consider individual is decision problem. Assuming that individuals are innitely-lived, we
can omit the time variable t as a state variable of the optimization problem; hence, we have,
for all t, that
Ui;t (!;j) = Ui (!;j) 8! 2 
iS; 8j; (8)
Vi;t (!;j) = Vi (!;j) 8! 2 
iP ; 8j; (9)
and
U i;t = U i; (10)
in addition,
i (!; t) = i (!) 8! 2 
iS. (11)
Since " = 1, (5) implies that Vi (!;j) = 0 for all ! 2 
iP and all j. From (1), we have
U i =

1  when  = 0.
Given the stated assumptions, the transition probability function QNV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j)
can be given by the transition matrix below:
(2; 0) (1; 0) (1; 1)
(1; 0)

if j = 0
if j = 1
1
2
0
1
2
0
0
1
(1; 1) 0 0 1
.
The rows of the matrix correspond to the current state of the population, while the columns
indicate the state of the population in the next period. The number in row a and column b
gives the probability that the state of the population will move from the state represented by
row a to the state represented by column b, conditional on individual i staying susceptible
in the next period. As an example, in the above matrix, the entry in row 1 and column 3
tells us that the probability that the population will move from state (1; 0) 2 
iS to state
(1; 1) 2 
iS is 0 if j ((1; 0)) = 0, and that this probability is 1 if j ((1; 0)) = 1. For brevity,
only the elements in 
iS that are needed for solving individual is optimization problem are
shown. Note that since Vi (!;j) = 0 for all ! 2 
iP and all j, it is not necessary to specify
the transition function QV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j) when solving a susceptible individuals problem.
Using the general Bellman equation (4) and the conditions stated above, it is straight-
forward to show that
Ui ((2; 0) ;j) = min

c;

1  

,
Ui ((1; 0) ;j) =

min

c; 

1
2
 

1 

+ 1
2
Ui ((1; 1) ;j)
	
if j ((1; 0)) = 1
min

c; 

1
2
 

1 

+ 1
2
 
1
2
U ((1; 0) ;j) +
1
2
U ((2; 0) ;j)
	
if j ((1; 0)) = 0
,
and
Ui ((1; 1) ;j) = min

c;

(1  ) (2  )

.
14We will henceforth assume that when individuals are homogeneous, all individualsvaccination cost is c.
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There are three cases to consider.
Case 1 : c > 
1  .
In this case, Ui ((2; 0) ;j) = 1  , Ui ((1; 1) ;j) =

(1 )(2 ) , and
Ui ((1; 0) ;j) =
(

(1 )(2 ) if j ((1; 0)) = 1
(2+)
(1 )(4 ) if j ((1; 0)) = 0
.
In equilibrium, no susceptible individual ever chooses to vaccinate.
Case 2 : 
(1 )(2 ) < c  1  .
In this case, Ui ((2; 0) ;j) = c, Ui ((1; 1) ;j) = (1 )(2 ) , and
Ui ((1; 0) ;j) =
(

(1 )(2 ) if j ((1; 0)) = 1
(c(1 )+2)
(1 )(4 ) if j ((1; 0)) = 0
.
In equilibrium, a susceptible individual chooses to vaccinate in state (2; 0), and does not
vaccinate in other states.
Case 3 : c  
(1 )(2 ) .
In this case, Ui ((2; 0) ;j) = Ui ((1; 1) ;j) = c, and Ui ((1; 0) ;j) = c if j ((1; 0)) = 1 or
j ((1; 0)) = 0. In equilibrium, a susceptible individual chooses to vaccinate in states (2; 0),
(1; 1) and (1; 0) and does not vaccinate in other states.
Note that, in all three cases, a susceptible individuals vaccination decision in state (1; 0)
does not depend on the other susceptible individuals action, i.e., a susceptible individual
would choose the same action no matter what the other susceptible individual chooses.
Therefore, there are no strategic interactions in this setting. Also, note that, regardless
of the parameter values, a susceptible individual employs a threshold policy whereby she
vaccinates if the number of individuals currently infected is above a critical number and
does not vaccinate otherwise.
3.2 Socially Optimal Vaccination
Given the assumptions that individuals are innitely lived and c1 = c2 = c, we have, for all
t,
Wt (!) = W (!) 8! 2 
. (12)
In addition, the transition probability function Q is given by the transition matrix below
(not all of the states in 
 are shown, since not all of them are needed for solving the social
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planners optimization problem):
(3; 0) (2; 0) (2; 1) (1; 0) (1; 1) (1; 2)
(3; 0) 1 0 0 0 0 0
(2; 0)

if n = 0
if n = 1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
(2; 1) 0 0 1 0 0 0
(1; 0)
8<:
if n = 0
if n = 1
if n = 2
1
4
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
2
0
1
4
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
(1; 1)

if n = 0
if n = 1
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
(1; 2) 0 0 0 0 0 1
:
From (6), (7), and the stated assumptions, we have W ((3; 0)) = 3
1  , W ((2; 1)) =
2
1  ,
and W ((1; 2)) = 
1  . Again, there are three cases to consider.
Case 1 : c > 
1  .
In this case, W ((2; 0)) = (2+)
1  , W ((1; 1)) =
2
(1 )(2 ) , and W ((1; 0)) =
(22+3+4)
(1 )(4 ) . In the
social optimum, no susceptible individual is vaccinated.
Case 2 : 
(1 )(2 ) < c  1  .
In this case, W ((2; 0)) = c + 2
1  , W ((1; 1)) =
2
(1 )(2 ) , and W ((1; 0)) =
4 2c2+2c+3
(1 )(4 ) .
In the social optimum, vaccination occurs only in state (2; 0).
Case 3 : c  
(1 )(2 ) .
In this case, W ((2; 0)) = c + 2
1  , W ((1; 1)) = c +

1  , and W ((1; 0)) = 2c +

1  . In the
social optimum, all susceptible individuals are vaccinated in states (2; 0), (1; 1), and (1; 0).
A comparison of the social optimum and the equilibrium shows that the timing and
extent of vaccination in equilibrium is socially optimal.
4 The Model with Spontaneous Recovery
We now relax Assumption A1 and consider the possibility that infected individuals may
recover spontaneously from the disease. This is the case studied by Francis (2004) without
discounting and by Francis (2007) with discounting. Reluga and Galvani (2011) consider
both recovery and waning of immunity. Gersovitz (2003) also considers recovery, but from
the infected to the susceptible state, so his results are therefore not directly comparable to
ours.15 Whether spontaneous recovery is possible is not merely a modeling choice, but is
determined by the disease at hand.
When recovery from infection is possible, it is the case that there are strategic interde-
pendencies between individualsdecisions. These create the potential for ine¢ ciencies, as we
will now show.
15See footnote 12.
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Turning to our setup, assume that  > 0 (while keeping all the other assumptions). In
this case, there are two ways for an individual to become protected: by vaccinating while
the individual is susceptible, or by recovering after being infected.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium pattern of vaccination may be socially suboptimal if indi-
viduals may recover spontaneously and become immune.
4.1 Equilibrium Vaccination
Consider individual is decision problem. Since individuals are innitely-lived, conditions
(8)-(11) hold, with Vi (!;j) = 0 for all ! 2 
iP and all j. In addition, following from
(1), the value of being infected for individual i is U i =

1 (1 ) . The transition probability
function QNV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j) is given by the transition matrix
(2; 0) (1; 0) (1; 1) (0; 1) (0; 2)
(1; 0)

if j = 0
if j = 1
1
2
(1  )
0
1
2
(1  )
0
1
2

1  
1
2

0
0

(1; 1) 0 0 1   0 
.
Since a susceptible individual has probability 0 of ever getting infected in states (0; 2) and
(0; 1), Ui ((0; 2) ;j) = Ui ((0; 1) ;j) = 0 8j. Also, Ui ((2; 0) ;j) = min
n
c, 
1 (1 )
o
.
4.2 Socially Optimal Vaccination
With innitely-lived individuals, condition (12) holds. The transition probability function
Q is given in Appendix A. It is easy to show that W ((0; 3)) = W ((0; 2)) = W ((0; 1)) =
0, W ((1; 2)) = 
1 (1 ) , W ((2; 1)) =
2
1 (1 ) , and W ((3; 0)) =
3
1 (1 ) . The following
example shows that the equilibrium need not coincide with the solution to the planners
problem (for more details of the example, see Appendix A).
4.3 Ine¢ ciency of Equilibrium: Example 1
Suppose that 
1 (1 ) > c >

(1 (1 ))(2 (1 )) . These parameter restrictions imply that, in
equilibrium, a susceptible individual vaccinates in state (2; 0) and does not vaccinate in state
(1; 1). Furthermore, in state (1; 0), both susceptible individuals choose not to vaccinate if
c  c 2


(1 (1 ))(2 (1 )) ;

(1 (1 ))

, where
c   (4  2 + 3)
2 (1   (1  )) (2   (1  ))2 :
For the social planners problem, given the stated parameter restrictions, it is optimal to
vaccinate the only susceptible individual in state (2; 0), and it is optimal to not vaccinate
the only susceptible individual in state (1; 1). In state (1; 0), it is optimal to vaccinate no
one if c  c, while it is optimal to vaccinate only one susceptible individual if c  c, where
c   (4  3 + 5)
(1   (1  )) (2   (1  )) (4  3 (1  )) :
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It is straightforward to show that c > c. This means that if c 2 (c; c), then in equilibrium no
one vaccinates in state (1; 0), but the socially optimal outcome is to vaccinate one susceptible
individual.
5 The Model with Imperfect Vaccines
We now relax Assumption A2, i.e., that once vaccinated, an individual is no longer sus-
ceptible to infection. Imperfect vaccines are considered in equilibrium settings by Heal and
Kunreuther (2005), Chen (2006), Chen and Cottrell (2009), Boulier (2009) and Reluga and
Galvani (2011). It is also considered by Sadique et al. (2005). We model imperfect vaccines
by assuming that once vaccinated, the individual still has a positive (but reduced) proba-
bility of becoming infected.16 The decision to model vaccines as perfect is often made for
simplicity, but it is ultimately an empirical question whether it is an appropriate modeling
assumption for a given disease/vaccine combination.
Previewing the results of this section, recall that one consequence of perfect vaccines
was that in the symmetric equilibrium, vaccinated individuals did not benet from the
vaccination of others. In other words, in equilibrium there were no external e¤ects. With
imperfect vaccines, this conclusion no longer holds. Specically, even when vaccinated, an
individual is only partially protected against infection. This means that even protected
individuals benet from the vaccination of others, since they are still potential sources of
infection. Therefore, even in a fully symmetric equilibrium, there are positive externalities
that are not internalized by the individuals; this drives a wedge between the equilibrium
outcome and the rst-best vaccination pattern.
We now turn to the analysis of the model with imperfect vaccines, i.e., " < 1. We
maintain all other assumptions, so that the only way for an individual to be protected is
through vaccination.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium pattern of vaccination may be socially suboptimal if vaccines
are imperfect.
5.1 Equilibrium Vaccination
Given innitely-lived individuals, conditions (8)-(11) hold. Looking at individual is op-
timization problem, the value of being infected in this case is U i =

1  . The transition
16An alternative would be to assume that vaccination is successful only with some probability and that
with the remaining probability, the vaccinated individual remains susceptible. In this alternative setting,
if the success or failure of the vaccine is unobservable, then a vaccinated but uninfected individual would
always remain uncertain about his immunity. Furthermore, there would be scope for repeated vaccination in
order to increase the probability of obtaining immunity. While this scenario is an interesting one, we focus
on the simpler setting in which the vaccine is always successful but only confers limited immunity.
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probabilities QV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j) given (I; P ) 2 
iS are as follows:
(2; 1) (1; 0) (1; 1) (1; 2)
(2; 0) 1 0 0 0
(1; 0)

if j = 0
if j = 1
1
2
1
2
(1  ")
0
0
1
2
0
0
1  1
2
(1  ")
(1; 1) 1
2
(1  ") 0 0 1  1
2
(1  ")
: (13)
For QV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j) given (I; P ) 2 
iP , we have the transition matrix
(2; 1) (1; 1) (1; 2)
(2; 1) 1 0 0
(1; 1)

if j = 0
if j = 1
1
2
1
2
(1  ")
1
2
0
0
1  1
2
(1  ")
(1; 2) 1
2
(1  ") 0 1  1
2
(1  ")
: (14)
5.2 Socially Optimal Vaccination
As before, condition (12) holds since individuals are innitely-lived. The matrix of transition
probabilities Q (!0 j !; n) is given in Appendix B. The following example shows that the
equilibrium need not coincide with the solution to the planners problem.
5.3 Ine¢ ciency of Equilibrium: Example 2
Suppose that  = 9
10
, " = 2
3
, and  = 1. It is straightforward using (4), (5), and the
transition matrices (13) and (14) to show that, for c > 471
310
, no one chooses to get vaccinated
in equilibrium (for more details of this example, see Appendix B). For the planners problem,
it is easy to show, using (6) and (7), that, for c 2  119
62
; 109
50

, the solution is to vaccinate
the only susceptible individual when there is one susceptible individual and one protected
individual, and not to vaccinate anybody in other states. Since 471
310
< 119
62
, the solution to
the planners problem di¤ers from the equilibrium for c 2  119
62
; 109
50

.
6 The Model with Heterogeneous Individuals
We now relax Assumption A3 and introduce ex ante heterogeneity to the model. Hetero-
geneity is also considered by Brito et al. (1991), Xu (1999) and Kureishi (2009), but they
do so using static frameworks. Heterogeneity is also a key feature of the dynamic model
of Gersovitz (2003), but takes a di¤erent form than the one considered here. Last, Fran-
cis (1997) also considers heterogeneity in a dynamic framework and nds that his welfare
theorem continues to hold. His result is contradicted by ours. We should point out that
heterogeneity, as introduced in this section, is ex ante heterogeneity, i.e., heterogeneity that
characterizes the individuals at the outset. Ex ante homogeneity is usually imposed for ease
of analysis, but in practice, individuals are heterogeneous along a number of dimensions such
as susceptibility, risk attitudes and income.
To briey preview the results of this section, recall that the Francis result held in part
because in equilibrium, both the planner and the individuals chose to vaccinate all remaining
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susceptibles at the same time. As a consequence, in equilibrium there were no external
e¤ects, since all potential beneciaries of a given individuals vaccination were themselves
fully protected via their own vaccination. When individuals are ex ante heterogeneous, they
face di¤erent trade-o¤s and will thus choose di¤erent pattern of vaccination (specically, they
may choose to vaccinate at di¤erent critical levels of disease prevalence). But this means that
in equilibrium, there are (non-internalized) external e¤ects. The individuals ignore these but
the planner does not, leading to equilibrium under-vaccination relative to the rst-best.
Turning to the analysis, suppose c2  c1, where c2 is prohibitively high so that individual
2 would never choose to get vaccinated and the social planner would not choose to vaccinate
this individual, regardless of disease prevalence. We now show that the equilibrium outcome
may di¤er from the e¢ cient outcome.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium pattern of vaccination may be socially suboptimal if indi-
viduals are ex ante heterogeneous.
6.1 Equilibrium Vaccination
Since individuals are innitely-lived, conditions (8)-(11) hold, with U1 =

1  and V1 (!;j) =
0 for all ! 2 
1P . Note that 2 (!) = 0 for all ! 2 
2S given our assumption on c2. The value
U1 ((2; 0) ;2) solves U1 ((2; 0) ;2) = min

c1;

1 
	
. Let us suppose that c1  1  so that
individual 1 would choose to get vaccinated if the other two individuals are both infected.
Now, let us consider individual 1s problem when only individual 3 is infected. With our
assumptions, the value U1 ((1; 0) ;2) solves
U1 ((1; 0) ;2) = min

c1; 

1
2


1  

+
1
4
U1 ((1; 0) ;2) +
1
4
U1 ((2; 0) ;2)

= min

c1; 

1
2


1  

+
1
4
U1 ((1; 0) ;2) +
1
4
c1

: (15)
It is easy to check that the solution to (15) is as follows: there exists a threshold value c,
where
c  
(1  ) (2  ) ; (16)
so that individual 1 vaccinates if c1 < c and does not vaccinate if c1 > c; when c1 = c,
individual 1 is indi¤erent between the two choices.
6.2 Socially Optimal Vaccination
For the social planners problem, we need to distinguish between the state (2; 0) when the
two infected individuals are individuals 1 and 3 from the state (2; 0) when the two infected
individuals are individuals 2 and 3. LetW1;3 ((2; 0)) denote the value of the state (2; 0) when
the two infected individuals are individuals 1 and 3, and let W2;3 ((2; 0)) denote the value of
the state (2; 0) when the two infected individuals are individuals 2 and 3. Using dynamic
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programming arguments, the planners value function solves
W ((1; 0)) =  + min

c1 +

2
[W ((2; 1)) +W ((1; 1))]

4
[W ((1; 0)) +W1;3 ((2; 0)) +W2;3 ((2; 0)) +W ((3; 0))]
;(17)
W ((3; 0)) =
3
1   ; (18)
W1;3 ((2; 0)) = 2 + W ((3; 0)) =
3
1     ; (19)
W2;3 ((2; 0)) = 2 + min fc1 + W (2; 1) ; W (3; 0)g ; (20)
W ((1; 1)) =  +

2
[W ((1; 1)) +W ((2; 1))] ; (21)
W ((2; 1)) = 2 + W ((2; 1)) =
2
1   : (22)
In the expression for W ((1; 0)), the rst argument is the value of vaccinating individual 1,
while the second argument is the value of not vaccinating individual 1. Note that W ((1; 1))
is the planners value when individual 2 is the only susceptible individual. As before, suppose
that c1  1  . Using (18) and (22), the solution to (20) is to vaccinate individual 1 when
individuals 2 and 3 are infected. This yieldsW2;3 ((2; 0)) = 21  + c1. Note that (21) and (22)
give us W ((1; 1)) = 2
(1 )(2 ) . It is straightforward though somewhat tedious to show
that the solution to (17) is as follows: there exists a threshold value c, where
c  
 
4     2
2 (2  )2 (1  ) ;
such that the social planner chooses to vaccinate individual 1 if c1 < c, does not vaccinate
individual 1 if c1 > c and is indi¤erent between vaccinating and not vaccinating individual
1 when c1 = c. The social planners threshold c is higher than the threshold value c that
individual 1 uses in equilibrium (see (16)). This means, in particular, that if c1 2 (c; c),
then what individual 1 chooses in equilibrium (namely not to vaccinate) is di¤erent from
what the social planner would choose (namely to vaccinate).
7 The Model with Inexible Vaccination Timing
We now relax Assumption A4 and consider the e¤ects of inexibility in vaccination timing.
As noted in the Introduction, there are several analyses in the literature in which the planner
and the individuals are only able to vaccinate once at the outset and are unable to revise
their decision at later stages (in case vaccination was not taken). These include those by
Brito et al. (1991), Geo¤ard and Philipson (1997), Xu (1999), Barrett (2003), Sadique
et al. (2005), Heal and Kunreuther (2005), Kureishi (2009), Boulier (2009) and Galeotti
and Rogers (2013). Inexible vaccination timing is a modeling assumption that is typically
imposed for simplicity, as it in some instances reduces complicated dynamic games to simpler
static games.
As in previous sections, the key to understanding the e¤ects of inexible vaccination
timing is that it induces strategic interaction, thereby driving a wedge between rst-best
and equilibrium outcomes.
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Assume that individuals have only one opportunity to get vaccinated, namely at time
0.17 As before, we assume that the state of the population at time 0 is (1; 0), i.e., there is
one infected individual and two susceptible individuals.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium pattern of vaccination may be socially suboptimal if vacci-
nation timing is inexible.
7.1 Equilibrium Vaccination
As before, U i;t =

1  for all t. Since the opportunity to get vaccinated exists only at t = 0, i
must satisfy the condition i (!; t) = 0 for all t > 0 and ! 2 
iS, i = 1; 2, and the individuals
decision problem (4) has to be modied to account for this restriction. First, consider any
period t > 0, in which vaccination is not an option. We must have, for (I; P ) 2 
iS,
Ui;t ((I; P ) ;j) = 
24I
2
U i;t+1 +

1  I
2
 X
!02
iS
QNV (!
0 j (I; P ) ;j)Ui;t+1 (!0;j)
35 .
Since individuals are innitely-lived, Ui;t (!;j) = Ui (!;j) for all t > 0 and ! 2 
iS. The
transition probability function QNV (!0 j (I; P ) ;j) given the restriction j (!; t) = 0 for all
t > 0 is specied by the transition matrix
(2; 0) (1; 0) (1; 1)
(1; 0) 1
2
1
2
0
(1; 1) 0 0 1
:
It is straightforward to show that
Ui ((1; 1) ;j) =

(1  ) (2  ) ;
Ui ((2; 0) ;j) =

1   ;
Ui ((1; 0) ;j) =
 (2 + )
(1  ) (4  ) :
At time 0, when the state is (1; 0), susceptible individual is decision problem is
min

c; 0 + 
 
1
2
U + 1
2
Ui ((1; 1) ;j)
	
if j ((1; 0) ; 0) = 1
min

c; 0 + 
 
1
2
U + 1
2
 
1
2
Ui ((1; 0) ;j) +
1
2
Ui ((2; 0) ;j)
	
if j ((1; 0) ; 0) = 0
:
The equilibrium is given as follows: if c  
(1 )(2 ) , then both susceptible individuals
vaccinate at time 0; if 
(1 )(2 )  c  (2+)(1 )(4 ) , then only one susceptible individual
vaccinates at time 0; last, if c  (2+)
(1 )(4 ) , then no individual vaccinates at time 0. In this
setting, therefore, a susceptible individuals decision can depend on the action of the other
susceptible individual. This is the case when c 2
h

(1 )(2 ) ;
(2+)
(1 )(4 )
i
.
17Alternatively, one could introduce inexibility by assuming that vaccination is only available every n th
period or that it is available in each period with some probability p 2 (0; 1).
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7.2 Socially Optimal Vaccination
Let us modify the planners problem (6) to incorporate the restriction that the vaccination
opportunity exists only at t = 0. For any t > 0, when vaccination is not possible, the value
of the planners problem must solve
Wt ((I; P )) = I + 
X
!02

Q (!0 j (I; P ) ; 0)Wt+1 (!0) (23)
for all (I; P ) 2 
. The transition function Q ( j ; 0) is given as follows:
(3; 0) (2; 0) (2; 1) (1; 0) (1; 1) (1; 2)
(3; 0) 1 0 0 0 0 0
(2; 0) 1 0 0 0 0 0
(2; 1) 0 0 1 0 0 0
(1; 0) 1
4
1
2
0 1
4
0 0
(1; 1) 0 0 1
2
0 1
2
0
(1; 2) 0 0 0 0 0 1
:
Since individuals are innitely-lived, we have Wt (!) = W (!) for all t > 0 and ! 2 
. It is
easy to show using (23) and the transition matrix above that
W ((1; 0)) =
 
4 + 3 + 22


(1  ) (4  ) ;
W ((2; 0)) =
(2 + ) 
1   ;
W ((1; 1)) =
2
(1  ) (2  ) ;
W ((3; 0)) =
3
1   ;
W ((2; 1)) =
2
1   ;
W ((1; 2)) =

1   :
At t = 0, when the state of the population is (1; 0) and the opportunity to vaccinate
susceptible individuals exists, the planners problem is
min
8<:
 + 
 
1
2
 
1
2
W ((1; 0)) + 1
2
W ((2; 0))

+ 1
2
 
1
2
W ((2; 0)) + 1
2
W ((3; 0))

 + c+ 
 
1
2
W ((1; 1)) + 1
2
W ((2; 1))

 + 2c+ W ((1; 2))
:
The solution to the social planners problem is given as follows: if c  
(1 )(2 ) , then it is
optimal to vaccinate both susceptible individuals at time 0; if 
(1 )(2 )  c 
(4+ 22)
(1 )(2 )(4 ) ,
then it is optimal to vaccinate one susceptible individual at time 0; last, if c  (4+ 2
2)
(1 )(2 )(4 ) ,
then it is optimal to not vaccinate any individual time 0. Since
(4+ 22)
(1 )(2 )(4 ) >
(2+)
(1 )(4 ) ,
if (2+)
(1 )(4 ) < c <
(4+ 22)
(1 )(2 )(4 ) , then in equilibrium no one vaccinates even though it is
socially optimal for one susceptible individual to get vaccinated.
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8 The Model with a Finite Horizon
We now relax Assumption A5 and consider the model under a nite planning horizon. While
nite horizon models are routinely used for solving the planners problem in the mathematical
biology literature, to our knowledge ours is the rst exploration of the e¤ects that the
planning horizon may have on the social optimality of equilibrium vaccine uptake. As noted
in the Introduction, when the horizon is nite, the model features strategic interactions. As
we will show, this can in turn create the scope for non-internalized external e¤ects from
vaccination.
Turning to the analysis, we assume that each individual lives for three periods (t = 0; 1; 2).
At the beginning of period 0, individual 3 is infected, while the other two individuals are
susceptible. For simplicity, assume that the discount factor  is 1.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium pattern of vaccination may be socially suboptimal if the
horizon is nite.
8.1 Equilibrium Vaccination
Since the model applies only to periods 0, 1, and 2, the following hold: for all t > 2,
U i;t = 0, Ui;t (!;j) = 0 for all ! 2 
iS, and Vi;t (!;j) = 0 for all ! 2 
iP . Furthermore, the
assumption that the vaccine confers perfect immunity implies that Vi;1 (!;j) = Vi;2 (!;j) =
0 for all ! 2 
iP . Given these restrictions, a susceptible individual is decision problem is as
follows:
Ui;0 ((1; 0) ;j) =

min

c; 1
2
(2) + 1
2
Ui;1 ((1; 1) ;j)
	
if j ((1; 0) ; 0) = 1
min

c; 1
2
(2) + 1
2
 
1
2
Ui;1 ((1; 0) ;j) +
1
2
Ui;1 ((2; 0) ;j)
	
if j ((1; 0) ; 0) = 0
;
Ui;1 ((1; 0) ;j) = min

c;
1
2


;
Ui;1 ((1; 1) ;j) = min

c;
1
2


;
Ui;1 ((2; 0) ;j) = min fc; g ;
Ui;2 (!;j) = min fc; 0g = 0 for all ! 2 
iS:
Unlike in the innite-horizon setting, there are now strategic interactions since whether
a susceptible individual chooses to get vaccinated or not can depend on whether someone
else decides to vaccinate or not. To see this, suppose c > , which yields Ui;1 ((1; 0) ;j) =
Ui;1 ((1; 1) ;j) =
1
2
 and Ui;1 ((2; 0) ;j) = . If, furthermore, c 2
 
5
4
; 11
8


, then we have
c > 1
2
(2) + 1
2
Ui;1 ((1; 1) ;j) and c < 12 (2) +
1
2
 
1
2
Ui;1 ((1; 0) ;j) +
1
2
Ui;1 ((2; 0) ;j)

. This
means that in period 0, it is optimal for individual i to vaccinate when j ((1; 0) ; 0) = 0,
and not to do so when j ((1; 0) ; 0) = 1.
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8.2 Socially Optimal Vaccination
Our nite-horizon restriction means that Wt (!) = 0 for all t > 2. The social planners
problem is given below.
W0 ((1; 0)) =  + min
8<:
1
4
W1 ((1; 0)) +
1
2
W1 ((2; 0)) +
1
4
W1 ((3; 0))
c+ 1
2
W1 ((1; 1)) +
1
2
W1 ((2; 1))
2c+W1 ((1; 2))
;
W1 ((1; 0)) =  + min
8<:
1
4
W2 ((1; 0)) +
1
2
W2 ((2; 0)) +
1
4
W2 ((3; 0))
c+ 1
2
W2 ((1; 1)) +
1
2
W2 ((2; 1))
2c+W2 ((1; 2))
;
W1 ((1; 1)) =  + min

1
2
W2 ((1; 1)) +
1
2
W2 ((2; 1)) ; c+W2 ((1; 2))

;
W1 ((1; 2)) =  +W2 ((1; 2)) ;
W1 ((2; 0)) = 2 + min fW2 ((3; 0)) , c+W2 ((2; 1))g ;
W1 ((2; 1)) = 2 +W2 ((2; 1)) ;
W1 ((3; 0)) = 3 +W2 ((3; 0)) ;
W2 ((I; P )) = I for all (I; P ) 2 
.
The following example shows that the equilibrium need not coincide with the solution to
the planners problem.
8.3 Ine¢ ciency of Equilibrium: Example 3
Suppose that 3
2
 > c > 11
8
. Let us rst consider the equilibrium outcome. In this case,
Ui;1 ((1; 0) ;j) = Ui;1 ((1; 1) ;j) =
1
2
 and Ui;1 ((2; 0) ;j) = , which imply that neither
individual 1 nor individual 2 would choose to get vaccinated in state (1; 0) in period 0. Now,
consider the solution to the planners problem. In this case, we have that
W1 ((1; 1)) = min

5
2
; 2 + c

=
5
2
;
W1 ((1; 0)) = min

3;
5
2
 + c; 2 + 2c

= 3;
W1 ((2; 0)) = min f5; 4 + cg = 5;
W1 ((3; 0)) = 6;
W1 ((2; 1)) = 4;
W1 ((1; 2)) = 2;
W0 ((1; 0)) = min

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4
;
17
4
 + c; 3 + 2c

=
17
4
 + c:
Therefore, in state (1; 0) in period 0, the planner would choose to vaccinate one susceptible
individual.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the social optimality of equilibrium vaccination patterns
under decentralized decision making. We nd that the welfare theorem of Francis (1997) may
not be robust to changes in his su¢ cient conditions. Specically, we relax the assumptions
of homogeneity, innite planning horizon, no recovery from infection, perfect vaccines and
perfectly exible vaccination timing. We nd that when relaxing any of these assumptions,
equilibrium vaccine uptake may be di¤erent than that chosen by a benevolent social planner.
This stems from the fact that the Francis welfare theorem is a consequence of (a) ex ante
homogeneity and (b) the absence of strategic interaction in vaccination decisions.
As we have shown in several di¤erent ways in this paper, in general, one should expect
that some welfare loss will be the outcome of fully decentralized vaccination decisions. Hav-
ing said that, in order to make any sensible statements about policy interventions based on
this insight, one should carefully consider the disease at hand and determine which of the
departures from the Francis framework applies to the particular disease or policy environ-
ment. Simply relying on the notion that individuals under-vaccinate and therefore there
is scope for policy intervention is not su¢ cient, as the Francis analysis shows. It should
also be food for thought that the Francis framework is in a sense the natural dynamic
model to show that the market leads to under-vaccination, although we have seen that it is
in fact inadequate for this purpose. At the very least, it shows that one should be cautious
in relying on intuitions about the welfare properties of vaccination markets without resorting
to explicit analysis.
Turning to possible corrective policies, the ine¢ ciencies in decentralized vaccine uptake
that we have identied can be overcome by o¤ering individuals suitable state-dependent
Pigouvian subsidies.18 But while such subsidies can in principle perfectly align private and
public incentives to vaccinate against a disease, they may be di¢ cult to implement in prac-
tice. This is because the subsidy on o¤er at any given point in time must depend on aggregate
disease prevalence at that time. In heterogeneous populations, the optimal Pigouvian sub-
sidy to an individual may furthermore depend on the characteristics of the individual in
question and on the identity of the infected individuals. In practice, more simple schemes
must be considered, which limits how far subsidies can go in decentralizing the socially
optimal vaccination policy.
Although for ease of exposition our analysis considered models with only three individu-
als, our main results regarding the ine¢ ciencies of equilibrium vaccination patterns, as well
as the reasons behind these ine¢ ciencies, extend to settings with any number of individuals.
Ultimately, the ine¢ ciency of equilibrium vaccination arises from external e¤ects and the
strategic interdependence of individualsvaccination decisions, and the existence of these are
wholly independent of assumptions concerning how many individuals there are in the vacci-
nation market. Note also that, for any N > 3, it is easy to extend our modeling framework
to a market with N individuals. The only changes that need to be made are: (i) changing
the 2 in the denominator of equations (2) and (3) to N   1; and (ii) dening the probability
transition functions QV , QNV , and Q appropriately.
18See Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2012) for such a subsidy scheme in the context of treatment and (non-
vaccine) prevention in the SIS model.
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Last, we should like to make a few comments about how our analysis contributes to the
debate on whether public intervention in vaccine markets is warranted on e¢ ciency grounds.
It is clear that the case against any public intervention, at least to the extent that it relies
on the Francis neutrality result, is weakened as a result of our ndings. While it is di¢ cult a
priori to point out which of the su¢ cient assumptions for the welfare theorem are violated in
a given situation (i.e., for a given population, disease and vaccine combination), it is hard to
accept the supposition that none of them are violated. On the face of it, this suggests that
there is indeed a case for interventions that align private and public incentives for vaccination
uptake. Having said that, we should also emphasize that while the Francis assumptions are
su¢ cient for the neutrality result to hold, they are in fact not necessary. There are many
instances in which the su¢ cient assumptions are violated but where the neutrality result still
holds. It is ultimately an empirical question, whether the environment and the parameters
of the problem are such that decentralized vaccination decisions are socially e¢ cient. In
short, the extent to which public intervention in vaccine markets is warranted on e¢ ciency
grounds is not something that can be determined purely through formal analysis. As such,
any case for or against such intervention must draw not only in analysis but also on a detailed
knowledge of the environment.
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Appendices
A Spontaneous Recovery
A.1 Socially Optimal Vaccination
The transition probability function Q for the social planners problem is given by the follow-
ing transition matrix (because of the size of this matrix, it is broken up into two parts):
(3; 0) (2; 0) (2; 1) (1; 0)
(3; 0) (1  )3 0 3 (1  )2 0
(2; 0)

if n = 0
if n = 1
(1  )2
0
0
0
2 (1  )
(1  )2
0
0
(2; 1) 0 0 (1  )2 0
(1; 0)
8<:
if n = 0
if n = 1
if n = 2
1
4
(1  )
0
0
1
2
(1  )
0
0
1
4

1
2
(1  )
0
1
4
(1  )
0
0
(1; 1)

if n = 0
if n = 1
0
0
0
0
1
2
(1  )
0
0
0
(1; 2) 0 0 0 0
(0; 3) 0 0 0 0
(0; 2) 0 0 0 0
(0; 1) 0 0 0 0
(1; 1) (1; 2) (0; 3) (0; 2) (0; 1)
(3; 0) 0 32 (1  ) 3 0 0
(2; 0)

if n = 0
if n = 1
0
0
2
2 (1  )
0
2
0
0
0
0
(2; 1) 0 2 (1  ) 2 0 0
(1; 0)
8<:
if n = 0
if n = 1
if n = 2
1
2

1
2
(1  )
0
0
1
2

1  
0
0

0
1
2

0
1
4

0
0
(1; 1)

if n = 0
if n = 1
1
2
(1  )
0
1
2

1  
0

1
2

0
0
0
(1; 2) 0 1    0 0
(0; 3) 0 0 1 0 0
(0; 2) 0 0 0 1 0
(0; 1) 0 0 0 0 1
:
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A.2 Example 1
Given 
1 (1 ) > c >

(1 (1 ))(2 (1 )) , we have Ui ((1; 1) ;j) =

(1 (1 ))(2 (1 )) , Ui ((2; 0) ;j) =
c, and, given j (1; 0) = 0,
Ui ((1; 0) ;j)
= min
(
c;

 
2c+ 4   3c   2   2c+ c2 + 3c22   c23 + 6c+ 3  3c2   3c2
(4   (1  )) (1   (1  )) (2   (1  ))
)
:
In state (1; 0), the value of not vaccinating is lower than the value of vaccinating when c  c.
Therefore, in equilibrium, no individual vaccinates in state (1; 0) when c  c.
For the social planners problem, W ((1; 1)) = (2+)
(1 (1 ))(2 (1 )) and W ((2; 0)) = c +
2
1 (1 ) . In state (1; 0), the value of vaccinating both susceptible individuals is 2c+

1 (1 ) ,
and the value of vaccinating only one susceptible individual is c + (2+)
(1 (1 ))(2 (1 )) . With
the given parameter restrictions, it is better to vaccinate only one susceptible individual than
both susceptible individuals. This implies that, in state (1; 0), the social planners problem
reduces to choosing between vaccinating only one susceptible individual and vaccinating no
one. The value of vaccinating no one is
1
(1   (1  )) (2   (1  )) (4   (1  )) 

8 + 4c + 2   6c2 + 2c3   32   6c22
+ 6c32   2c33 + 22   4c+ 6+ 12c2  6c3+ 42 :
If c  c, then it is better to vaccinate no one; if c  c, then it is better to vaccinate only one
susceptible individual.
B Imperfect Vaccine
B.1 Socially Optimal Vaccination
The transition probability function Q for the social planners problem is given by the follow-
ing transition matrix (because of the size of this matrix, it is broken up into two parts):
(3; 0) (2; 0) (2; 1)
(3; 0) 1 0 0
(2; 0)

if n = 0
if n = 1
1
1  "
0
0
0
"
(2; 1) 1  " 0 "
(1; 0)
8<:
if n = 0
if n = 1
if n = 2
1
4
1
4
(1  ")
1
4
(1  ")2
1
2
1
4
(1  ")
0
0
1
2
 
1  1
2
(1  ")
(1  ")  1  1
2
(1  ")
(1; 1)

if n = 0
if n = 1
1
4
(1  ")
1
4
(1  ")2
1
4
(1  ")
0
1
2
 
1  1
2
(1  ")
(1  ")  1  1
2
(1  ")
(1; 2) 1
4
(1  ")2 0 (1  ")  1  1
2
(1  ")
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(1; 0) (1; 1) (1; 2)
(3; 0) 0 0 0
(2; 0)

if n = 0
if n = 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
(2; 1) 0 0 0
(1; 0)
8<:
if n = 0
if n = 1
if n = 2
1
4
0
0
0
1
2
 
1  1
2
(1  ")
0
0
0 
1  1
2
(1  ")2
(1; 1)

if n = 0
if n = 1
0
1
2
 
1  1
2
(1  ")
0
0 
1  1
2
(1  ")2
(1; 2) 0 0
 
1  1
2
(1  ")2
:
B.2 Example 2
With the given parameter values, if no individual ever chooses to get vaccinated, then
Ui ((2; 0) ;j) = 9, Ui ((1; 0) ;j) =
261
31
, Ui ((1; 1) ;j) =
207
25
,
Vi ((2; 1) ;j) =
15
2
, Vi ((1; 1) ;j) =
69
10
, Vi ((1; 2) ;j) =
23
2
:
To see that this is indeed an equilibrium, consider individual is decision problem when
individual i is susceptible.
 State (2; 0) 2 
iS: The expected, discounted cost of vaccinating, c+ ["Vi ((2; 1) ;j) + (1  ")U i],
(weakly) exceeds the expected, discounted cost of not vaccinating, U i, when c  32 .
 State (1; 1) 2 
iS: The expected, discounted cost of vaccinating,
c+

1
2
(1  ")U i +

1  1
2
(1  ")

1
2
(1  ")Vi ((2; 1) ;j) +

1  1
2
(1  ")

Vi ((1; 2) ;j)

,
exceeds the expected, discounted cost of not vaccinating,


1
2
U i +
1
2

1
2
(1  ")Ui ((2; 0) ;j) +

1  1
2
(1  ")

Ui ((1; 1) ;j)

;
for all c > 0.
 State (1; 0) 2 
iS: Given that j ((1; 0)) = 0, the expected, discounted cost of vacci-
nating for individual i,
c+ 

1
2
(1  ")U i +

1  1
2
(1  ")

1
2
Vi ((2; 1) ;j) +
1
2
Vi ((1; 1) ;j)

,
exceeds the expected, discounted cost of not vaccinating,


1
2
U i +
1
2

1
2
Ui ((2; 0) ;j) +
1
2
Ui ((1; 0) ;j)

,
when c  471
310
.
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Taken together, these results imply that if c > 471
310
, the no susceptible individual ever chooses
to vaccinate in equilibrium.
For the planners problem, if the only susceptible individual is vaccinated in state (1; 1),
and no individual is vaccinated in any other state, then the value function W must be as
follows:
W ((1; 0)) =
832
31
, W ((2; 1)) =
55
2
, W ((3; 0)) = 30, W ((1; 2)) = 23, W ((2; 0)) = 29, W ((1; 1)) = 23+c.
Now, let us check that this is indeed the solution to the planners problem.
 State (2; 0): The expected, discounted sum of all costs if the only susceptible individual
is vaccinated, c+  [(1  ")W ((3; 0)) + "W ((2; 1))], exceeds the expected, discounted
sum of all costs if no one is vaccinated, W ((3; 0)), when c  3
2
.
 State (1; 1): The expected, discounted sum of all costs if the only susceptible individual
is vaccinated,
c+

4
(1  ")2W ((3; 0)) + 
2
(1  ")

1  1
2
(1  ")

W ((2; 1))
+

1  1
2
(1  ")

1
2
(1  ")W ((2; 1)) + 

1  1
2
(1  ")
2
W ((1; 2)) ;
is (weakly) lower than the expected, discounted sum of all costs if no one is vaccinated,

4
(1  ")W ((3; 0)) + 
2

1  1
2
(1  ")

W ((2; 1))
+

4
(1  ")W ((2; 0)) + 

1  1
2
(1  ")

1
2
W ((1; 1)) ;
when c  109
50
.
 State (1; 0): The expected, discounted sum of all costs of vaccinating one susceptible
individual,
c+

4
(1  ")W ((3; 0)) + 
4
(1  ")W ((2; 0))
+

1  1
2
(1  ")

1
2
W ((2; 1)) + 

1  1
2
(1  ")

1
2
W ((1; 1)) ;
exceeds the cost of not vaccinating anyone, 

1
4
W ((1; 0)) + 1
4
W ((3; 0)) + 1
2
W ((2; 0))

,
when c  6141
3410
. Also, the expected, discounted sum of all costs of vaccinating two
susceptible individuals,
2c+

4
(1  ")2W ((3; 0)) + 

1  1
2
(1  ")
2
W ((1; 2))
+2

1
2
(1  ")

1  1
2
(1  ")

W ((2; 1)) ;
exceeds the expected, discounted sum of all costs of not vaccinating anyone when
c  119
62
.
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Taken together, these results imply that, for c 2  119
62
; 109
50

, the solution to the planners
problem is to vaccinate the only susceptible individual in state (1; 1), and not to vaccinate
anyone in all other states.
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